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Abstract
This article is an examination of human oversight in EU policy for controlling algorithmic systems in
automated legal decision making. Despite the shortcomings of human control over complex
technical systems, human oversight is advocated as a solution against the risks of increasing reliance
on algorithmic tools. For law, human oversight provides an attractive, easily implementable and
observable procedural safeguard. However, without awareness of its inherent limitations, human
oversight is in danger of becoming a value in itself, an empty procedural shell used as a stand-in
justification for algorithmization but failing to provide protection for fundamental rights. By
complementing socio-legal analysis with Science and Technology Studies, critical algorithm studies,
organization studies and human-computer interaction research, the author explores the impor-
tance of keeping the human in the loop and asks what the human element at the core of legal
decision making is. Through algorithmization it is made visible how law conceptualises decision
making through human actors, personalises legal decision making through the decision-maker’s
discretionary power that provides proportionality and common sense, prevents gross miscarriages
of justice and establishes the human encounter deemed essential for the feeling of being heard. The
analysis demonstrates the necessary human element embedded in legal decision making, against
which the meaningfulness of human oversight needs to be examined.
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Introduction
Following the recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), algorithmic decision making
(ADM) systems are being increasingly deployed to support or completely automate legal decision
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making across the public domain, including courts and public administration. Defined as encoded
procedures for solving problems by transforming input data into a desired output and producing
recommendations on this basis,1 algorithmic systems are said to contribute to the ‘algorithmisa-
tion’ of governance, a distinct form of social ordering that becomes entwined with autonomous
software.2 A range of ADM systems are used across our societies to facilitate or automate decision
making, examples ranging from online activities such as curation of search engine results, targeted
advertising and content moderation to organisational processes such as recruitment decisions,
managerial surveillance and resource allocation.
Algorithmic systems also increasingly contribute to decisions on public administration, whether
a person is entitled to a social benefit, whether a family will be in need of child protection services,
or whether an immigrant gets refugee status or citizenship, with great hopes for AI deployment in
the judiciary also being expressed.
The concern for fundamental rights has created a global push towards AI ethics, producing a
plethora of ethical guidelines meant to limit the risks and negative consequences associated with
the algorithmisation of society.3 Sometimes framed as ‘ethics washing’, the instruments have been
criticised for their non-binding nature, blurry scope of application, and lack of clear implementa-
tion guidelines for programmers and administrators of justice, that could be implemented easily
through checklists, all of which contributes to their limited ability to regulate AI systems.4 How-
ever, the problem representations as well as the solutions proposed are bound to influence the
emergent hard-law approaches, as the juridification of AI regulation proceeds.5
Currently, human oversight is advocated by a range of actors as a focal ethical principle for AI
development and deployment. For example, the EU Commission’s Communication in 2019 por-
trayed human agency and oversight as the first of seven key requirements AI applications must
follow to be considered trustworthy.6 The risks and challenges hoped to be addressed by human
oversight include dangers to human autonomy, lack of transparency and opaque algorithmic
models, privacy and data protection issues, as well as discrimination.7 Similarly, the ethical guide-
lines developed by the Council of Europe’s European Commission for the efficiency of justice
1. T. Gillespie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’, in T. Gillespie, P. J. Boczkowski and K. A. Foot (eds.), Media Tech-
nologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society (MIT Press, 2014), p. 167.
2. A. Aneesh, ‘Global Labor: Algocratic Modes of Organization’, 27 Sociological Theory (2019), p. 347; K. Yeung and M.
Lodge (eds.), Algorithmic Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2019).
3. The German non-profit organisation AlgorithmWatch provides online a global inventory of AI ethics Guidelines listing
over 80 documents at the time of writing in April 2020. See, ‘AI Ethics Guidelines Global Inventory’, AlgorithmWatch
(2020), https://algorithmwatch.org/en/project/ai-ethics-guidelines-global-inventory/.
4. See e.g. T. Hagendorff, ‘The Ethics of AI Ethics: An Evaluation of Guidelines’, 30 Minds and Machines (2019), https://
arxiv.org/abs/1903.03425; B. Mittelstadt et al., ‘The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate’, 3 Big Data & Society
(2016), p. 1; D. Greene, A. L. Hoffmann, and L. Stark, ‘Better, Nicer, Clearer, Fairer: A Critical Assessment of the
Movement for Ethical Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning’, Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (2019), http://hdl.handle.net/10125/59651.
5. It should be noted that for the time being the regulatory landscape regarding the use of ADM systems in the society at
large or in the legal domain remains unclear, although the urgent need for socio-legal research is widely acknowledged.
See K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds.), Algorithmic Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2019); J. Cohen, Between Truth
and Power (Oxford University Press, 2019).
6. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social
committee and the Committee of the regions building trust in human-centric artificial intelligence, COM/2019/168, p. 3.
7. See e.g. R. Koulu, ‘Human control over automation: AI ethics and EU policy’, 12 European Journal of Legal Studies
(2020), p. 9.
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(CEPEJ) emphasise the need for user control over AI and that AI deployment should not under-
mine access to a judge, going as far as suggesting a right to a natural judge.8
In this article, I examine human oversight from a socio-legal perspective, focusing particularly
on the procedural dimension of algorithmisation in the context of legal decision making. Legal
decision making in public administration and in the judiciary constitutes a specific context for AI
deployment, characterised by a high level of regulation that aims to provide procedural safeguards
as well as accountability mechanisms. This said, legal processes produce a variety of decisions
with varying legal effects, ranging from the mundane routine-like cases in public administration to
cases with wide discretionary power such as civil and commercial adjudication. Understanding this
diversity brings the level of discretion at the core of examination, as the broader discretion of the
human decision-maker is often perceived to also constitute an increased risk of arbitrariness.9
Simultaneously, discretion is vital for introducing reasonability and context-sensitivity to the
application of law as well as for producing systemic renewal through precedents. Hence the legal
system aims to control the use of public power by striking a balance between sufficient freedom in
the form of discretion and sufficient due process and accountability structures that temper that
decision making power.
However, it is not only reined-in discretionary power that defines legal decision making but
also the physical confrontation between the parties and the judge.10 This encounter is at the core
of our understanding of fair trial, which often assumes such an encounter in the physical man-
ifestation of the day in court. Although not necessarily explicitly said, the encounter gives
substance to many due process standards such as the right to be heard and equality of arms, and
also encompasses much of the critique of the access to justice and ADR movements that empha-
sised the practical and emotional needs of those seeking justice instead of formal institutional
settings and perspectives.
Algorithmisation of legal decision making raises questions about both of these concepts and the
answers may reveal something fundamental about the ways law defines fairness. What happens to
the decision-maker’s discretion with increasing reliance on ADM systems? Can you encounter a
machine in a meaningful way? These questions define what ADM deployment means for legal
decision making, the decision-maker’s moral and legal responsibility over machine-generated
decisions and meeting the due process and justice expectations of those affected. In other words,
law assigns the power and the responsibility to the human decision-maker for the realization of due
process, substantial justification and institutional legitimacy of legal decision making.
8. See, European ethical Charter on the use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment,
CEPEJ (2019), p. 8, 15, https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/cepej-european-ethical-charter-on-the-use-of-artificial-
intelligence-ai-in-judicial-systems-and-their-environment. Interestingly, the annexed study connects the right to a
judge to natural persons: ‘There is also a need to consider whether these solutions are compatible with the individual
rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). These include the right to a fair trial (par-
ticularly the right to a natural judge established by law, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal and equality
of arms in judicial proceedings) and, where insufficient care has been taken to protect data communicated in open data,
the right to respect for private and family life.’ [emphasis added].
9. E.g. N. Luhmann, Organization und Entscheidung (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2000), p. 136, also p. 51 and
294.
10. For example, Vilhelm Aubert recognises in his legal anthropological research a specific dynamic of conflict man-
agement across cultural contexts, where the introduction of a neutral third as the representative of the society trans-
forms the dyad of conflicting parties into a triad. See V. Aubert, ‘Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict
and Conflict Resolution’, 7 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1963), p. 26.
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The aim with this article is to draw an overview of the necessary human element we associate
with legitimate and fair legal decision making. I argue that algorithmisation challenges existing
conceptualisations of legal decision making by making visible the inherently human face of
procedural justice, articulated both through the procedural norms regulating decision-makers’ use
of discretion and the procedural experiences of those seeking justice. Ultimately, law still per-
ceives the human decision-maker as constitutive for fair decision making. Simply put, humans are
the implicit medium of law. This human medium has been engrained in the deep structure of law,
to the form of legal institutions and processes. Where should the line between human and machine
action be drawn? What makes human input meaningful?
Although no clear line can be drawn because of the complexity and contextuality of algor-
ithmisation, a more nuanced understanding of the human element enables us to ask what is
needed from human oversight for due process. Algorithmisation crystallises the importance of
humans in two aspects of legal decision making. First, the human element is embedded in the
decision-makers’ use of discretion. Second, the human-faced ideal is inherent in the procedural
values behind the feeling of being heard and encountered as a human being for those seeking
justice. Of these two aspects, discretion and encounter, this article focuses particularly on the
first due to the prominence of the judge’s perspective in procedural law. By bridging debates on
AI ethics and algorithmisation, early research on the impact of technical systems on organisa-
tional decision making and socio-legal research, this procedural context also complements and
guides critical policy analysis on algorithmic decision making and the role of the human over-
seer.11 This enables us to ask what is meant by human oversight and, more importantly, what do
we want it to mean.
The argument is built in four steps. First, the analysis is contextualised in terms of
algorithmisation of legal decision making that calls for a systemic reassessment of current
legal thought (section 2). Second, a brief description is provided of the current EU regulation
and emerging AI policy, depicting the importance attributed to human oversight as a proce-
dural safeguard against the risks of algorithmic systems (section 3). Third, based on insights
from socio-legal and human-computer interaction research, the feasibility of human oversight
is contested (section 4). Finally, the human element of legal decision making is located in the
importance given to human decision-maker’s discretionary power, the use of which algorith-
misation is changing (section 5).
Algorithmisation as law’s mirror: systemic risks and
shortcomings of law
In this section, I briefly discuss how algorithmisation is seen as a fundamental challenge to how
law operates, how it conceptualises rights and interests, and establishes actors, institutions, and
procedures. By aggravating the need for systemic reassessment, algorithmisation provides a mirror
for critical reflection, enabling us to elaborate the shortcomings of existing legal structures,
revealing the limitations of current legal doctrine. In the context of legal decision making, such
analysis touches particularly on procedural and administrative law doctrines.
Despite siloed approaches, there is a widespread consensus regarding the need to reform dispute
resolution mechanisms, shared both by access to justice scholars and socio-legal algorithm
11. R. Koulu, European Journal of Legal Studies (2020) (Forthcoming), p. 9.
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studies.12 The shortcomings of existing court and ADR mechanisms are acknowledged and digital
technologies are often suggested as a solution to many of the problems faced by publicly funded
conflict management: the pressure for more efficiency and continuous budget cuts, delays in pro-
cessing time and demands for improved quality, insufficient guidance for citizens, the well-being of
government officials at work, and the changing expectations of society. Hailing from the US, where
the civil justice crisis runs deeper than in many European justice systems, Julie Cohen points out that
there is no reason why dispute resolution mechanisms should remain the same any more than there is
a reason to assume their algorithmisation would lead to increased fairness or efficiency. Instead,
understanding the dynamic complexity forms the starting point for reassessment:
‘‘The ongoing processes of judicial retrenchment and reconfiguration are the products of a
complex encounter between the liberal-activist paradigm underlying the traditional, court-
centred system of procedural justice, the affordances that networked digital technologies offer for
large-scale information aggregation and processing, and the ascendant ideology of neoliberal
governmentality.’’13
If human oversight is the solution, what is the problem? Karen Yeung conceptualises prob-
lems caused by algorithmisation by differentiating between (i) process-based concerns, (ii)
outcome-focused concerns and (iii) predictive personalisation of services.14 Process-based con-
cerns include formal due process and actual capabilities needed for contestation but also issues of
transparency, explainability and reason giving, as well as the dehumanising impact automation
has on decision making processes.15 Outcome-based concerns are more substantive and may
relate to discriminatory decisions and the aggravating impact ADM systems have on societal
inequalities, whereas mass surveillance and behaviour modification are risks related to the
predictive personalization of services.16 Furthermore, Yeung emphasises the cumulative effect
of algorithmisation that should be assessed not only from the perspectives of individuals and
groups, but also from those of the overall society. Legal rights have an intergenerational scope
that also obliges current generations to ensure legal protection and renewal of law for future
generations, although individualistic rights-discourses often dismiss this overarching obligation.
Following similar argumentation as Cohen, Yeung perceives the risks of algorithmisation as
systemic and collective, which further limits the feasibility of individualistic legal doctrine to
conceptualise these challenges.17
In a sense, algorithmisation can be seen as a step closer to the ideal-type model of Weberian
bureaucracy, defined by hierarchy of power, supremacy of written rules and discipline and control,
promising legal certainty to the letter.18 This way, algorithmisation comes with the promise of
improved quality by removing human shortcomings, errors and biases. At the same time, growing
awareness of ADM risks and challenges demonstrates the (often implicit) importance granted to
12. See e.g. J. Resnik, ‘A2J/A2 K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and
Arbitrations’, 96 North Carolina Law Review (2018), p. 102; J. Cohen, Between Truth and Power, p. 143-144.
13. J. Cohen, Between Truth and Power, p. 143-144.
14. K. Yeung, ‘Why Worry about Decision making by Machine?’, in K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds.), Algorithmic Reg-
ulation (Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 24.
15. Ibid. p. 24-31.
16. Ibid. p. 31-35.
17. Ibid. p. 42.
18. I. Koivisto, ‘Thinking Inside the Box. The Promise and Boundaries of Transparency in Automated Decision making’,
EUI Working Papers AEL 2020/01 (forthcoming), https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/67272.
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human decision-makers’ in casu consideration and common sense, the application of discretionary
power in a given context when necessary. As Yeung puts it, the removal of humans also removes
human virtues that provide necessary flexibility to rigidness of legal rules.19
The challenge goes deeper than doctrinal de lege lata and de lege ferenda research is able
to answer, calling for a critical systemic reassessment of law’s deep structure, building on
interdisciplinary foundation. Taking into consideration the existing research on algorithmisa-
tion, are there alternative ways to conceptualise legal decision making and the role of human
decision-makers? In turn, such analysis requires us to understand how the current human-
faced procedures have come about and how these forms encompass different historical layers
of regulatory design and the gradual social evolution over past decades of computers and
centuries of fair trial principles. Without systemic overview, we face the risk of throwing the
baby out with the bath water, of getting rid of vital components of procedural justice simply
because we do not recognize them as such. Rouvroy argues that prima facie redundancies and
inefficiencies of court procedure may in fact be constitutive for the use of discretionary
power. By creating silences and pauses, breaks in the process pipeline, inefficiency may be
necessary for creating a space for discretion, to support decision-makers’ intuitive thinking.20
In a similar vein, in addition to easy implementation into technological design, we need to
critically examine what makes human oversight valuable, and what the procedural values and
principles attached to human decision-makers that constitute due process and procedural
justice are.
Hence, systemic review is needed but remains difficult, as it is not always clear what is needed.
Against this backdrop, what would human oversight entail, if it were to become the focal proce-
dural mechanism to ensure legal compliance and protection of fundamental rights? In legal deci-
sion making, such functions are allocated to the human decision-makers, which include judges in
their courts, case workers and bureaucrats in public administration, parliamentary ombudsmen and
other authorities in charge of legality control, specifics depending on the context and constitutional
design. Legal institutions as we know them are often defined by their human actors, and legal
decision making is defined by the discretionary power exercised by the personalised representative
of the institution, the judge or administrator. The importance of discretion is reflected in the
difficulties of automating legal decision making as well as differentiating such hard cases from
routine cases that are allegedly more pliable to automation. Algorithmisation enables us to exam-
ine in new ways, whether and why this human element is necessary, and what would be lost if
human decision-makers become human overseers.
In the following section, I examine how human oversight is conceptualized in the EU’s emer-
ging AI policy and what objectives are assigned to it, to elaborate on what meaningful human
oversight should be in legal decision making.
19. K. Yeung, in K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds.) Algorithmic Regulation, p. 29. The human judge’s ability to exercise
common sense has also been framed as the inductive element of legal decision making, where human input provides
flexibility and renewal of law and deductive logic of legislation provides legal certainty. See e.g. A. Cornelis, ‘Is it
possible to program an ethical system? Foundation of Social Impact Assessment in the Theory of Informatics’, in A.
Martino, F. Natali and S. Binazzi (eds.), Automated Analysis of Legal Texts. Logic, Informatics, Law (Elsevier, 1985),
p. 53.
20. A. Rouvroy, ‘The end(s) of critique: data behaviourism versus due process’, in M. Hildebrandt and K. de Vries (eds.),
Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: The philosophy of law meets the philosophy of technology
(Routledge, 2013), p. 151.
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Human oversight in EU regulation and policy
Many issues related to increasing ADM deployment are framed through the EU’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 679/2016)21 which, since its implementation in May
2018, has provided the primary European legal instrument for automated data processing,
data protection and privacy. According to Article 22 on automated decision making and
profiling, a data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on this
automated processing, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly sig-
nificantly affects him or her. Although the article suggests a ban on automated decision
making, the ban’s importance is narrowed down by the broad exceptions.22 For example,
automated decision making is rendered compliant with GDPR if it is mandated by national
legislation and enough measures are ensured to safeguard the data subject’s rights and free-
doms and legitimate interests Article 22(2b). Simply put, Article 22 of GDPR sets the stage
for human oversight over algorithmic systems.
Before being replaced by the European Data Protection Board since the implementation of
the GDPR, the independent advisory body called the Article 29 Working Party (WP29)
produced guidelines on the interpretation of the regulation’s Article 22.23 The WP29 guide-
lines define automated decision making as ‘the ability to make decisions by technological
means without human involvement’, which may or may not include or overlap with profiling,
which refers to ‘any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of
personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to
analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic
situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or move-
ments’.24 The WP29 guidelines emphasise that fabricated human involvement is not sufficient
to avoid the Article 22 provisions, but instead, the human oversight needs to be meaningful in
the sense that the overseer should have the authority and competence to change the decision.25
Also, the procedural safeguards stipulated by the GDPR highlight the data subject’s ability to
contest the processing of their data, stimulating discussions on how to implement contest-
ability to technological design.26
21. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ L 119.
22. See also M. Brkan & G. Bonnet, ‘Legal and Technical Feasibility of the GDPR’s Quest for Explanation of Algorithmic
Decisions: of Black Boxes, White Boxes and Fata Morganas’, 11 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2020), p. 18.
23. ‘Guidelines on Automated individual decision making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2106/679,
wp251rev.01’, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.
cfm? item_id¼612053.
24. Ibid. p. 6-8.
25. Ibid. p. 21. Similarly, in legal scholarship, Brkan addresses the performative human control in ‘rubber stamping’ and
contends that meaningful intervention by human overseer requires both authority and capacity to change the decision
based on automated processing. See M. Brkan, ‘Do Algorithms Rule the World? Algorithmic Decision making and
Data Protection in the Framework of the GDPR and Beyond’, 27 International Journal of Law and Information
Technology (2019), p. 91, 94.
26. See, for example, M. Almada, ‘Human intervention in automated decision making: Toward the construction of
contestable systems’, 17th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL 2019) (Forthcoming),
pp. 2-11.
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The Commission’s new digital package published in February 2020 elaborates the future policy
setting around AI and other data-intensive technological systems.27 The digital package includes
four documents, all of which echo the EU’s established agenda about ‘trustworthy’ and ‘human-
centric’ AI, built on the acknowledged importance of human oversight for the protection of human
autonomy and fundamental rights.28 For mapping out the scope of human oversight, particularly
interesting are the Report on the safety and liability implications and the White paper on AI.
The Report on the safety and liability implications of AI, Internet of Things and robotics
locates the challenges of AI systems within the safety and product liability framework, which are
regulated in the EU through the General Product Safety Directive.29 Thus policy issues are
framed in terms of consumer protection, overall trust and predictable regulatory environment
for businesses, suggesting that AI-related problems can be solved through these regimes. Simul-
taneously, the focus also narrows down the problem representation. Although the EU agenda
understandably focuses on the policy issues that can be solved within the scope of the EU’s
mandate, the problem definition excludes the cumulative and collective effects of algorithmisa-
tion that fundamentally challenge existing legal concepts and structures. Furthermore, limited
focus excludes other legal fields and their mechanisms from potential policy action, although
approaches from competition law, labour law, tax law and procedural law might bring additional
instruments to the policy debate.
The Report describes the characteristics of AI that give rise to the policy issues. These include
the connectivity, autonomy and data dependency that enable AI systems to ‘perform tasks with
little or no human control or supervision’.30 The Report construes the so-called ‘black-box
effect’ as a central policy problem, referring to the opacity of some AI systems,31 that can be
solved by transparency and explainability. Policy actions could include obligations on devel-
opers to disclose design parameters and metadata of datasets in case of accident and ex post
assessment conducted by enforcement authorities based on such information disclosure. Finally,
the Report implies that human oversight may become a focal procedural safeguard for control-
ling AI systems throughout their lifecycle, with specific requirements being implemented in EU
legislation.32 If implemented, this stance sets high expectations for the efficiency of human
oversight.
The White paper on AI perceives AI harms both as material (for example health, damage to
property) and as immaterial (for example privacy, human dignity discrimination),33 recognising
how AI deployment can aggravate such patterns ‘without [the presence of] the social control
27. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European economic and social com-
mittee, Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics,
COM (2020) 64 final; Commission White Paper Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust,
COM (2020) 65 final; Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European
economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions, A European strategy for data, COM (2020) 66 final;
Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European economic and social
committee and the Committee of the regions, Shaping Europe’s digital future, COM (2020) 67 final.
28. ‘‘The Commission’s vision stems from European values and fundamental rights and the conviction that the human
being is and should remain at the centre.’’ See COM (2020) 66 final, p. 4.
29. COM (2020) 64 final, p. 2.
30. COM (2020) 64 final, p. 2.
31. COM (2020) 64 final, p. 9.
32. COM (2020) 64 final, p. 8.
33. COM (2020) 65 final, p. 10.
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mechanisms that govern human behaviour’.34 To combat these risks, the white paper pro-
poses the adoption of a risk-based approach, based on a two-pronged definition of high risk.
An ex ante risk assessment should be performed before AI deployment in high-risk sectors,
in which significant risks may occur such as in public administration, and for intended uses
when risks may occur.35 The White paper explains that the mandatory legal requirements
for AI need to be decided as a part of the design of the regulatory framework.36 In short,
legal decision making should be considered to be a high-risk domain in which hard law
regulation on AI may be necessary. Here, human oversight becomes a potentially important
regulatory tool.
The key requirements for high-risk AI applications listed high in the White paper are the
recommendations of the High-Level Expert Group on AI, which include human oversight.37
The White paper also connects the definition of high-risk sectors and uses, which include
the AI applications for a specific legal regime, and the required level of human oversight
with implementation examples.38 Firstly, human oversight may be required to review and
validate the system’s output before the decision becomes effective. Thus, the rejection of a
social security application would always be taken by a human. Secondly, human oversight
might take the form of human review after the decision has become effective, enabling
human intervention when needed. The given example involves automated rejection of credit
card application. Thirdly, human oversight could be implemented to monitor the AI system
while in operation and the ability to intervene, by including a stop button or procedure.
Fourthly, certain operational constraints can be imposed in AI design. The example for
design-based constraints is found in driverless cars that switch control to humans in certain
situations.
The EU’s emerging AI policy seems to focus on ex ante assessment, at the expense of
marginalising the elaboration of ex post mechanisms. This approach might clash with the ex
post mechanisms, based on which legal protection typically is produced, although the topic
deserves more thorough analysis. It remains unclear how the ex ante emphasis is able to
provide solutions to acknowledged lack of efficient redress.39 The policy documents propose
human oversight in its different forms as the primary ex post mechanism to ensure legal
protection. However, there is little substance by itself to the mechanism, leaving open what
needs to happen between the AI system and the human overseer to constitute as meaningful
protection. It is assumed that human oversight provides protection, partly following the
GDPR’s framing that grants it intrinsic value as a procedural mechanism that justifies auto-
mated processing.
34. COM (2020) 65 final, p. 11.
35. ‘For instance, uses of AI applications that produce legal or similarly significant effects for the rights of an individual or
a company; that pose risk of injury, death or significant material or immaterial damage; that produce effects that cannot
reasonably be avoided by individuals or legal entities.’ See COM (2020) 65 final, p. 17.
36. COM (2020) 65 final, p. 8.
37. Independent High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI’, European
Commission (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai. See also
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence, COM (2019)
168 final.
38. COM (2020) 65 final, p. 21.
39. K. Yeung, in K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds.), Algorithmic Regulation, p. 29.
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Human oversight and the (false) promise of control
The importance of human oversight over automation is widely acknowledged in socio-legal
scholarship. For example, John Danaher contends that because reliance on ADM limits active
human participation, the systems impose a fundamental threat to legitimacy, which he considers
difficult to accommodate or resist. In her work on law, technology and philosophy, Mireille
Hildebrandt addresses similar issues of justification and discusses the need for protection of
‘what is uncountable, incalculable or incomputable about individual persons’, which comes
under threat in the context of automated decision making, in which contestation by those sub-
jected to automation plays a vital role.40 It seems that human participation is required of
decision-makers and of those subjected to the consequences of decisions. Of these forms of
participation, human oversight relates primarily to the role of the human decision-maker, whose
task it is to ensure also meaningful participation to those affected. Hence, this role would entail
imposing the ultimate control over algorithmic systems, ensuring the protection of material and
procedural rights.
Contrary to the promise associated with human oversight in policy making, the practical
limitations of human capabilities to control complex technological systems have been much
discussed. At times, the regulatory frameworks and technical standards contribute to assigning
blame to the human-in-the-loop, practice conceptualised by Elish as ‘a moral crumple zone to
describe how responsibility for an action may be misattributed to a human actor who had limited
control over the behaviour of an automated or autonomous system’.41 For various reasons, from
boredom at routine monitoring to automation bias and alert fatigue, humans generally perform
badly as supervisors of automated technical systems.42 Sociologist John Perrow discusses human
error when accidents happen in complex technical systems and argues that the combined effects
of tightly coupled complex systems and a high risk potential render accidents unavoidable by
simple design choices.43 Science and Technology Studies scholar Sheila Jasanoff discusses the
fabricated and performative nature of ‘human pretensions of control over technological
systems’.44
These insights reveal how the feasibility of human oversight needs to be questioned in policy
making. Still, despite its limitations, human oversight becomes an enticing option for procedural
protection because it can be operationalized relatively easily, both within the technical specifica-
tion and within the legal system. Human oversight follows the form of institutionalized decision
making processes as they currently are, defined by human input, and in this sense its adoption as
the definitive procedural safeguard would not signify a far-reaching change of existing concep-
tualisations. Furthermore, through digital traces and metadata we can easily ascertain that the
oversight requirement has been fulfilled, that a human user has indeed been in the loop, on the
40. M. Hildebrandt, ‘Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to Agonistic Machine Learning’, 20
Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2019), p. 83-121. See also, M. Hildebrandt and K. de Vries (eds.), Privacy, Due Process
and the Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law meets the Philosophy of Technology.
41. M. Elish, ‘Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction’, 5 Engaging Science, Technology,
and Society (2019), p. 40.
42. For example, Bainbridge points out that ‘by taking the easy part of his task, automation can make the difficult parts of
the human operator’s task more difficult’. See, L. Bainbridge, ‘Ironies of Automation’, 19 Automatica (1983), p. 775-
779. See also, K. Yeung, in K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds.), Algorithmic Regulation, p. 25.
43. J. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Basic Books, 1984).
44. S. Jasanoff, ‘Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science’, 41 Minerva (2003), p. 223.
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loop or in command, to have pressed the button, or ticked the box. For these reasons, human
oversight may easily become a value, despite its limited feasibility.45
Algorithmisation seems to pose a new form of architectural control that becomes entwined with
legal structures, suggesting that it is the technological design that becomes the object of human
oversight. As Cohen states, legal institutions are not fixed but instead influence and are influenced
by managerial economic logic and affordances of technological structures.46 Yeung and Lodge
emphasise the cumulative effect of legal and technological normativity, where the technological
design is applied for regulatory purposes, creating new forms of control.47 This normativity of
technological architecture has long been recognised, some declaring it sui generis48 and others
arguing for a more generic concept of normativity that would not differentiate between regulatory
and technological design.49 Still, the legal system continues to struggle to include new computa-
tional tools in its existing structures and operations, as can be exemplified by a recent study on the
evidentiary value of ADM outputs in the courts.50
Decreasing human discretion in face of the computational turn
The challenges to law posed by algorithmic decision making do not boil down to issues of data
governance but instead are related to even more fundamental societal shifts, the increasing impor-
tance and reliance on computational processes in organising social interaction or, in Hildebrandt’s
terminology, the computational turn.51 By this framing, we are able to perceive algorithmisation in
its historical context, which opens up new venues for examination. When algorithmisation is seen
as one of the most recent steps of a continuum defined by the computational turn, we are able to
overcome a typical thought error related to technological change, as we tend to overexaggerate the
short-term and underestimate the long-term implications of any new technological tool. Such
contextualisation not only fixes the lack of long-term perspectives often associated with new
digital technologies but also opens up the lessons learned from early adoption of computers in
legal and administrative processes since the 1970s. In this sense, algorithmisation takes place
against the backdrop of long-term development of evidence-based decision making defined by
quantification and data intensity, where governance is increasingly based on the establishment of
measurable indicators and the application of statistical methods.52 This contextualized approach
helps us to locate how algorithmisation is influencing legal decision making in the long term and
draw from earlier research to understand better what happens when human decision-makers are
becoming human overseers of algorithmic systems.
45. K. Yeung, in K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds.), Algorithmic Regulation, p 25; R. Koulu, European Journal of Legal
Studies (2020) (forthcoming).
46. J. Cohen, Between Truth and Power, p. 5 and 143.
47. K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds.), Algorithmic Regulation, p. 5.
48. See e.g. L. Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006), http://codev2.cc/downloadþremix/.
49. M. Hildebrandt, ‘Legal and Technological Normativity: more (and less) than twin sisters’, 12 Techné (2008), p. 169.
50. G. Vanderstichele, ‘The Normative Value of Legal Analytics. Is There a Case for Statistical Precedent?’, Master Thesis
University of Oxford (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract¼3474878.
51. M. Hildebrandt and K. de Vries (eds.), Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law
meets the Philosophy of Technology.
52. See, for example, K. Davis, B. Kingsbury and S. Merry, ‘Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators’, in Kevin
Davis et al. (eds.), Governance by Indicators. Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (Oxford University
Press, 2012), p. 3-28.
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Early research on computerisation of public administration also demonstrates the importance of
the organisational setting in which technological systems are deployed. These perspectives high-
light how the long-term consequences are context-dependent, which also affects the role reserved
for human overseers. The unique implementation characteristics define the results of deployment,
such as the adoption rate and user resistance. Such characteristics are highly context-dependent yet
define the overall objectives and prioritised functionalities of the developed system: the hegemonic
actors in the organisation and the deployment process, the formal and informal practices estab-
lished in the organisation, the composition of the development team and the maintenance control.53
In empirical work on computers in public administration, Kenneth Laudon contextualised their
adoption through managerial rationality that emerged in the US from the Progressive reform in the
19th century that built on the ideal of rational effective government.54 Laudon also elaborated the
political dimension of computerised bureaucratic reform: to administrative reformers of the 1960s
and 1970s, computers signified a step closer to the bureaucratic ideal of rational effectiveness,
without having to risk a gruesome political debate on political objectives or a redistribution of
political power.55
Additionally Laudon emphasised centralisation in computerisation, the loss of control from the
public organisation to the central data bank, placing centralisation as one central variable related to
increasing reliance on automated information processing.56 Laudon’s study also demonstrated that
if the objectives are defined by a central authority external to the implementation organization, the
deployment is likely to focus on cost savings, increasing central control and employee surveil-
lance, whereas objectives defined internally by the organisation itself tended to focus on improving
the quality of internal processes.57 Centralisation as well as standardisation of work practices are
the necessary prerequisites to establish a standardised process outline which can then be
automated.
Similarly, Shoshana Zuboff describes automation in terms of a shift from comprehensive labour
requiring artisanal expertise to fragmented tasks requiring no prior skills, documenting how this
dumbing down has a negative impact on employees’ sense of control over their work and perfor-
mance.58 Lisa Bainbridge notes the ‘ironies of automation’, when the technology implementation
does not necessarily benefit the human operator but instead makes their work more difficult by
removing the routine tasks and allocating the harder monitoring and take-over tasks to them.59 For
our discussion, these insights document how human labour and sense of control changes when
humans become overseers of automation, suggesting that similar loss of control might also be
experienced by legal decision-makers faced with increasing algorithmisation.
Often overlooked particularly in doctrinal legal studies, the complexity and context-dependency
that result from institutional design are necessary for understanding the long-term consequences of
53. For example, Laudon describes how the organisation’s internal and external integration affect the consequences of
computer deployment. In organisations with high internal integration between employees, there was a stronger like-
lihood of resistance against computerisation. See K. Laudon, Computers and Bureaucratic Reform. The Political
Functions of Urban Information Systems (John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p. 73.
54. Ibid. p. 41-61.
55. Ibid. p. 52.
56. Ibid. p. 65.
57. Ibid. p. 308.
58. S. Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine. The Future of Work and Power (Basic Books, 1988), p. 48.
59. L. Bainbridge, 19 Automatica (1983), p. 775-779.
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algorithmisation for legal decision making. At least three observations can be made here. Firstly,
algorithmic decision making constitutes a type of ‘non-decision making’ in the sense that existing
institutional processes are standardised, datafied and automated by establishing the decision mak-
ing parameters in advance and implementing them in the architectural system design. Simply put,
the decision making is moved upstream, to the system architects and the boundary work between
the domain and technology experts, further away from the ‘street-level bureaucrats’.60 Despite the
context-dependency of technology deployment, loss of human discretion at the grass-roots level
has been described as a central consequence of the computational turn. Secondly, this loss of
discretion should be examined in relation to the discretionary space reserved to human decision-
makers by the institutional and regulatory design. We should not assume that human decision-
makers were free to use their discretionary freedom before the computational turn, as particularly
in public administration, decision-makers are required to follow not only the legislation but also
lower decree regulation as well as internal guidelines and organisational practices which tradi-
tionally have limited the scope of discretion significantly. Thirdly, it is likely that existing orga-
nisational practices of legal institutions are defined by human tasks, completed at most with the
help of simple office automation tools. These human-oriented tasks also form the model for
technology deployment by establishing the process, which is then implemented in the advanced
technological systems without systemic overview of their functions.
These observations highlight the importance of examining the human tasks that constitute legal
processes, as these are implemented both in the normative materials such as legislation and to the
informal everyday practices of administrating justice. Algorithmisation calls for empirical research
to map out the everyday decision making practices that become increasingly performed with
technological systems. In short, we cannot conceptualise algorithmisation only by looking at law
in books but instead the focus needs to be on algorithmisation of law as it is in action. For such
analysis, the socio-materiality of technological forms provides a complementary perspective.61
By pointing towards the everyday encounters human decision-makers have with technological
systems, socio-materiality reveals the ways in which decision-makers use digital technologies in
their everyday work and how their perceptions shape the consequences of algorithmisation.62 The
research conducted on computer-supported collaborative work and human-computer interaction
might also provide new venues for socio-legal analysis, enabling us to ask about the extent to
which extent improved interaction design can mitigate the loss of discretion that follows from
standardization and automation.
60. See, for example, A. Alkhatib and M. Bernstein, ‘Street-Level Algorithms: A Theory at the Gaps Between Policy and
Decisions’, CHI (2019); J. Pääkkönen et al., ‘Bureaucracy as a Lens for Analyzing and Designing Algorithmic Sys-
tems’, CHI (2020).
61. See, for example, W. Orlikowski, ‘Sociomaterial Practices: Exploring Technology at Work’, 28 Organization Studies
(2007), p. 1435–144.
62. If we are to examine how the sociomateriality of technology influences legal decision making processes, it is also
necessary to acquire empirical knowledge about the everyday work practices of lawyers, public administrators and
legal decision makers becoming increasingly defined by digital technologies. Some such studies exist. For example, the
Law Society of England and Wales has collected information about lawyers’ technology use through online surveys
and interviews. Although the results cannot be generalized across jurisdictional and cultural contexts, they give an
overview of on-going developments. See, ‘Capturing Technological innovation in Legal Services’, Law Society of
England and Wales (2017), https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-trends/capturing-technological-
innovation-report/.
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To those seeking justice in the courts, procedural rights such as the right to be heard are defined
through the encounter with the human judge. From the judge’s perspective, institutionalised into
procedural doctrine and due process standards, reason giving is a primary instrument to prove such
an encounter has taken place. The written grounds of the judgment communicate to the parties that
they have indeed been heard, that their opinions have been noted and thoroughly considered, even
though (and especially when) the outcome goes against them. But from the parties’ perspective, the
experience of being heard does not necessarily require written grounds but the ability to speak
one’s mind, as the seminal work of Lind and Tyler on social psychology of procedural justice
demonstrates.63 Yet encounter is not always important and to a certain extent it can be simulated
(and already is). In debates on automation of legal decision making we often tend to forget the
human is already out of the loop, that courts and public agencies apply standardised solutions and
produce routine-like decisions that do not require discretion.64 The encounter and the discretion
become decisive when creativity is needed, when there are exceptional circumstances at hand that
need to be taken into consideration, and when the standard routine does not apply.
To conclude, the algorithmisation of legal decision making is a multifaceted, dynamic process
heading towards hybridisation in complex socio-technical systems, which connects with shifting
modalities of governmentality and the changing roles legal institutions and administrative orga-
nisations play in the society. In this sense, algorithmisation is not simply about technology deploy-
ment or even the limits of automation but about complex interdependencies between actors,
regulatory frameworks as well as inter- and intra-organisational formal and informal practices
that define how humans make legal decisions increasingly with the support of technological
systems. The normativity of technological architectures becomes entwined with the long-term
trends towards increasing standardisation, datafication and automation of decision making pro-
cesses, contributing to the progressive loss of human discretion, raising concerns for the protection
of due process and other fundamental rights we associate with human discretion. In short, human
discretion is diminishing — or moving further away from the grassroots level — with technolo-
gical architectures, perhaps increasingly so with more autonomous algorithmic systems. It is
possible that assigning human decision-makers the role as human overseers is contributing to this
development instead of mitigating its negative consequences, if human oversight becomes perfor-
mative rubberstamping without meaning.
For the critical observer, algorithmisation reveals how law construes fairness through the
human element of legal decision making, how due process standards are formulated around tasks
and capabilities of human actors. Broad discretion tempered by accountability structures intro-
duces freedom to decision making, but this freedom is not random or arbitrary but instead creates
space for contextual consideration, understanding for the exceptional circumstances unique to that
case. Similarly, the experience of being heard is built on the impression of human encounter
between those seeking justice and the face of justice embodied in the person of the human
decision-maker. Discretion and the encounter can be monitored through the human actor’s reason
63. T. Lind and A. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Plenum Press, 1988).
64. In the context of court IT and Dutch civil procedure, Dory Reiling argues that the development of court technology
often builds on assumptions instead of the reality of the court organisation. Contrary to what the focus on physical court
proceedings, the day in court, might suggest, majority of civil cases are resolved in written procedures that require very
different digital tools than full-scale trials. Hence systemic review of what the courts actually do is necessary for
successful technology implementation. See D. Reiling, Technology for Justice. How Information Technology Can
Support Judicial Reform (Leiden University Press, 2009), p. 116, http://home.hccnet.nl/a.d.reiling/.
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giving that ultimately justifies what has been decided and why. To provide justification for
exceptional circumstances, reasons cannot be general clauses but instead need to reflect that what
has been heard has also been considered.
Conclusion
It seems more or less surprising that algorithmisation makes visible the necessary human element
of legal decision making, which is always implicitly present in legal materials but seldom
explained in legal thought that tends to focus on legal certainty and objectively measurable
equality before the law. In this sense, algorithmisation provides us with a steppingstone to map
out the underlying genealogy of modern legal processes and critically assess the basic assumptions,
values and objectives that are embedded in procedural design. For example, algorithmisation
reveals the personalized dimension of legal decision making, reflected in articulations of human
oversight advocated in EU policy and the right to a human judge promoted by CEPEJ’s ethical
guidelines on AI use in the judiciary.
The value given to human judgement demonstrates that we attribute to humans the ability to
produce legitimacy and justification for decisions, a task we perceive fundamentally impossible for
machines. We notice it is not enough to strive for legal certainty and objective, predetermined rules
but instead fair decision making requires creativity and freedom produced by the human individ-
uals. However, this also creates unpredictability.
Against this background, the personalisation of justice hidden in law’s deep structure becomes
visible: legal decision making is framed through the actions of human decision-makers, most
importantly through discretion. On one hand, discretion is arbitrariness that needs to be tamed
in through accountability mechanisms, institutionalised in principles on the judge’s strict personal
responsibility, publicity and transparency, sanctions for misuse of power. On the other, it is
creative freedom that needs to be enabled, institutionalised in principles on the independence and
impartiality of the judge. This tension between freedom and control, definitive of legal decision
making and sedimented in legal thought as the personal dimension of the human decision-maker, is
revealed by the mirror of algorithmisation. The tasks traditionally performed by humans (judges,
clerks, case workers and bureaucrats) are embedded in conceptualisations of due process and
procedural justice. This observation suggests that automation should not be focused on automating
human tasks, but instead the objectives and functions they reflect, which in turn requires an in-
depth understanding of legal decision making.
Another reflection surface is provided by the complex body of literature on the organisational
embeddedness and socio-materiality of technology, and hybridisation in complex socio-technical
systems that gives context to the algorithmisation of legal decision making. It demonstrates that the
consequences depend on various factors (of which formal legal structures are but one) making it
difficult to obtain a comprehensive overview of long-term implications. However, when concep-
tualised in terms of the on-going computational turn or digitalisation of legal practices, the worry-
ing loss of discretion comes into focus. It becomes clear that more research, both theoretical and
empirical, is needed to understand better the how the tension between the personal dimension and
organizational context of legal decision making plays out with algorithmisation.
This analysis provides a contribution to a more comprehensive view of the procedural dimen-
sion of algorithmisation. The examination locates the risks associated with AI deployment in the
legal domain to the focal role granted in law to the human decision-maker’s discretionary power.
Discretion as freedom and control is the definitive logic of the way legal processes operate and how
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law is renewed through precedents based on errors, conflicts, exceptions and the creative use of
discretionary power. If we are to impose control over AI systems through human oversight, we
need to ask what makes it meaningful and for that purpose we need an understanding of legal
decision making, both as a normative ideal and as collective everyday practices. The importance of
the human element for law sets high expectations for human oversight. It is unlikely that despite
the best intentions, that human oversight as such would provide a solution to the negative conse-
quences of algorithmisation. Here the EU’s emerging AI policy provides little guidance for what
constitutes ‘meaningful’. Furthermore, the proven limitations of humans as overseers of automated
systems cautions against attaching too much expectation to its feasibility. If we are not cautious of
these limitations, human oversight faces the risk of becoming a value in itself, turning human
decision-makers into rubberstamps, providing a sound procedural mechanism that can easily be
verified after it has been conducted yet being empty of meaning. In this sense it is possible that
emphasis on human oversight may aggravate the long-term negative consequences the computa-
tional turn is having on discretion.
Finally, we return to the double meaning already embedded in the concept of human oversight.
Oversight can be failure or mistake, so definitive of human action, as well as the action of over-
seeing, ensuring that failures or mistakes do not happen. Thus, equating the problem and the
solution, the concept encapsulates the paradoxical human dimension of decision making, and the
continuous balancing between freedom and control, discretionary power and legal certainty.
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